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Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 09:17:29 -0400
Message-Id: <199605211317.JAA28448@why.cert.org>
From: CERT Bulletin <cert-advisory@cert.org>
To: cert-advisory@cert.org
Subject: CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-96.07 - FreeBSD (system stability compromise)
Reply-To: cert-advisory-request@cert.org
Organization: CERT(sm) Coordination Center -  +1 412-268-7090
Sender: proff

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-96.07
May 21, 1996

Topic:  system stability compromise via mount_union program
Source: The FreeBSD Project, Inc.

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT
Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from the Free BSD
Project, Inc. The FreeBSD Project urges you to act on this information as soon
as possible. Their contact information is included in the forwarded text
below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further
information.

========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-96:10                                            Security Advisory
                                                    The FreeBSD Project, Inc.

Topic:          system stability compromise via mount_union program

Category:       core
Module:         unionfs
Announced:      1996-05-17
Affects:        FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current
Corrected:      (workaround) 2.1-stable and 2.2-current as of 1996-05-17
Source:         4.4BSD (lite)
FreeBSD only:   no

Patches:        ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:10/

=============================================================================

I.   Background

     A bug was found in the union file system code which can allow
     an unprivileged local user to compromise system stability.
     This problem is present in all source code and binary
     distributions of FreeBSD version 2.x released before 1996-05-18.

     All FreeBSD users are encouraged to use the workaround provided
     until the FreeBSD Project distributes a full solution.


II.  Problem Description

     The union filesystem code had problems with certain mount ordering
     problems.  By executing a certain sequence of mount_union commands,
     an unprivileged local user may cause a system reload.

     NOTE: This is a different problem than the one discussed in
     FreeBSD SA-96:09.  The workaround for this vulnerability is
     similar to the one discussed in 96:09, but the proper solution
     for the unauthorized access problem in 96:09 does not address
     this vulnerability.


III. Impact

     The problem could allow local users to compromise system stability.

     This vulnerability can only be exploited by users with a valid
     account on the local system.


IV. Solution(s)

     The FreeBSD project is currently developing a solution to this
     problem,  however the proper solution will not be available until
     a future FreeBSD release.  We do not anticipate releasing patches
     for previous versions of FreeBSD due to the extensive nature of this
     fix.  This security advisory will be updated as new information is
     made available.

V. Workaround

     This vulnerability can quickly and easily be limited by removing
     the setuid permission bit from the mount_union program.  This
     workaround will work for all versions of FreeBSD affected by
     this problem.

     As root, execute the command:

          % chmod u-s /sbin/mount_union

     then verify that the setuid permissions of the files have been
     removed.  The permissions array should read "-r-xr-xr-x" as
     shown here:

           % ls -l /sbin/mount_union
           -r-xr-xr-x  1 root  bin   53248 Apr 26 04:40 /sbin/mount_union

     In addition to changing the permissions on the executable files,
     if you have the source code installed, we suggest patching the
     sources so that mount_union will not be installed with the
     setuid bit set:

*** /usr/src/sbin/mount_union/Makefile  Sun Nov 20 14:47:52 1994
 --- /usr/src/sbin/mount_union/Makefile        Fri May 17 10:36:09 1996
***************
*** 8,14 ****
  CFLAGS+= -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys -I${MOUNT}
  .PATH:        ${MOUNT}

 - BINOWN= root
 - BINMODE=4555
 -
  .include <bsd.prog.mk>
 --- 8,11 ----

=============================================================================
The FreeBSD Project, Inc.

Web Site:                       http://www.freebsd.com/
Confidential contacts:          security-officer@freebsd.org
PGP Key:                        ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc
Security notifications:         security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion:     security@freebsd.org

Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
        modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
        Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
        for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=============================================================================

=========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (FIRST).

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email.
The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the
CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key
         ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key


CERT Contact Information
- ------------------------
Email    cert@cert.org

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST
                (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for
                emergencies during other hours.

Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
        CERT Coordination Center
        Software Engineering Institute
        Carnegie Mellon University
        Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
        USA

CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other
security-related information are available from
        http://www.cert.org/
        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/

CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
        comp.security.announce

To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your
email address to
        cert-advisory-request@cert.org


CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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