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Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 20:11:36 +0000
Subject: FWD: ASSIST 96-12 Patches for Solaris 
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Subject:       [Support request] FWD: ASSIST 96-12 Patches for Solaris statd vulnerability.
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ASSIST's www site is http://www.assist.mil

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team
                                                _____
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     /  \   \___  \___    |    \___    |       |   <      et
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   /      \ \___/ \___/ __|__  \___/   |       |_____\
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
    
                       Bulletin  96-12
 
       Release date: July 30, 1996, 3:30 PM EDT (GMT -4)
 
SUBJECT:  Patches for Solaris statd vulnerability.
 
SUMMARY:  There is a vulnerability that exists in the Solaris 2.X 
(SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) rpc.statd utility.  
The vulnerability has resulted from incomplete validation of 
information received by rpc.stats from rpc.lockd.                                           		                                    
BACKGROUND: Sun Microsystems Inc. has issued a bulletin with 
information about this problem and how to acquire patches.
The bulletin is included in the Recommended Solutions section
below.
 
IMPACT:	The rpc.statd can be made to remove or create any file 
that the root user can remove or create on the NFS server.  This 
would easily be exploited to gain unauthorized root access. 
 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS:  Review the Sun Microsystems Inc. bulletin 
below and apply the approprate fixes and patches.

=================================================================

          SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996
 
=================================================================

 
BULLETIN TOPICS
 
In this bulletin Sun announces the release of security-related patches
for both Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x). The
patches relate to a single vulnerability involving the statd program.
 
 This vulnerability, which affects the products of several UNIX 
vendors, has previously been discussed in CERT (sm) Advisory CA-96.09, issued 
on 24 Apr 96. As of this writing, Sun is aware of no successful attacks
based on this problem.
 
 
I.   Who is Affected, and What to Do
 
II.  Understanding the Vulnerability
 
III. List of Patches
 
IV.  Checksum Table
 
 
APPENDICES
 
A.   How to obtain Sun security patches
 
B.   How to report or inquire about Sun security problems 

C.   How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status update
  
       Send Replies or Inquiries To:
          Mark Graff
          Sun Security Coordinator
          MS MPK17-103
          2550 Garcia Avenue 
          Mountain View, CA 94043-1100
 
          Phone: 415-786-5274
          Fax:   415-786-7994
          E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
  
 
Sun acknowledges with thanks both the CERT Coordination Center 
(Carnegie Mellon University) and Wolfgang Ley (of DFN/CERT) for their 
assistance in the preparation of this bulletin.

Sun, CERT, and DFN/CERT are all members of FIRST, the Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit
the FIRST web site at "http://www.first.org/". For information about
the upcoming 8th FIRST Conference and Workshop (Santa Clara, CA, July
28-31, 1996) see "http://ciac.llnl.gov/firstconf".
 
Keywords: statd, root, file_creation, file_deletion
Patchlist: 100988-05, 101592-07, 102516-04, 102769-03, 102770-03, 
102932-02, 103468-01, 103469-01  

Cross-Ref: CERT CA-96.09
           -----------

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin for
the purpose of alerting Sun customers to problems, as long as the
Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems.
 
Any other use of this information without the express written consent
of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly 
disclaims all liability for any misuse of this information by any third party.

========================================================================

          SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996
 
========================================================================
 
 
I.   Who is Affected, and What to Do
 
Sun has verified that this vulnerability affects all supported 
Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) systems.

Installing and running the software provided in these patches
completely closes the vulnerability.
 
For information about how to obtain these and other Sun patches, see
Appendix A.
   
II.  Understanding the Vulnerability
 
If exploited, this vulnerability can be used to remove any file that
the root user can remove or to create any file that the root user can
create. The security of a system could be completely compromised in
this way.
 
The following information, excerpted from the cited CERT(sm) 
advisory, provides some details. (Note: statd is called "rpc.statd" on many
other UNIX systems.)
  
	When an NFS server reboots, rpc.statd causes the previously held
	locks to be recovered by notifying the NFS client lock daemons 
	to resubmit previously granted lock requests. If a lock daemon 
	fails to secure a previously granted lock on the NFS server, it sends
 	SIGLOST to the process that originally requested the file lock.

        The vulnerability in rpc.statd is its lack of validation of the
        information it receives from what is presumed to be the remote
        rpc.lockd.  Because rpc.statd normally runs as root and because 
	it does not validate this information, rpc.statd can be made to
	remove or create any file that the root user can remove or 
	create on the NFS server.

 
III. List of Patches
 
The patches required to close this vulnerability are listed below.
 
     A. Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) patches
 
     Patches which replace the affected statd executable are available
     for every supported version of SunOS 5.x.
 
         OS version              Patch ID
         ----------              ---------
         SunOS 5.3               102932-02
         SunOS 5.4               102769-03
         SunOS 5.4_X86           102770-03
         SunOS 5.5               103468-01
         SunOS 5.5_X86           103469-01 

B.  Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) patches
  
     For SunOS 4.1.x, the fix is supplied in a new version of the "UFS
     file system and NFS locking" jumbo patch.
 
         OS version              Patch ID
         ----------              ---------
         4.1.3                   100988-05
         4.1.4 SunOS 4.1.3_U1    101592-07
         SunOS 4.1.4             102516-04
 
 
IV.  Checksum Table
 
In the checksum table we show the BSD and SVR4 checksums and MD5 
digital signatures for the compressed tar archives.

     File             BSD          SVR4        MD5                     
     Name             Checksum     Checksum    Digital Signature
     ---------------  -----------  ---------   
--------------------------------
     100988-05.tar.Z  10148 444    4116 888    
ACE925E808A582D6CF9209FE7A51D23B
     101592-07.tar.Z  21219 346    32757 692   
7B7EE4BD5B2692249FDB9178746AA71B
     102516-04.tar.Z  65418 201    61604 401   
DB87F3DDA2F12FE2CFBB8B56874A1756
     102769-03.tar.Z  38936 74     64202 148   
9A8E4D9BE8C58FD532EE0E2140EF7F85
     102770-03.tar.Z  04518 71     23051 141   
F646E2B7AD66EEFBB32F6AB630796AF8
     102932-02.tar.Z  34664 70     45816 139   
66CB7F6AE48784A884BA658186268C41
     103468-01.tar.Z  30917 82     46790 164   
84680D9A0D2AEF62FFE1382C82684BE5
     103469-01.tar.Z  31245 82     52288 164   
F22AEB0FD91687DAB8ADC4DF10348DE8
 
 
The checksums shown above are from the BSD-based checksum (on 4.1.x,
/bin/sum; on SunOS 5.x, /usr/ucb/sum) and from the SVR4 version on
on SunOS 5.x (/usr/bin/sum).
 
 
APPENDICES
 
A.   How to obtain Sun security patches
 
     1. If you have a support contract Customers with Sun support 
        contracts can obtain any patches listed in this bulletin 
        (and any other patches--and a list of patches) from:
 
        - SunSolve Online
        - Local Sun answer centers, worldwide
        - SunSITEs worldwide
 
The patches are available via World Wide Web at http://sunsolve1.sun.com. 

You should also contact your answer center if you have a support contract and:
 
        - You need assistance in installing a patch 
        - You need additional patches
        - You want an existing patch ported to another platform
        - You believe you have encountered a bug in a Sun patch
        - You want to know if a patch exists, or when one will be ready
 
     2. If you do not have a support contract Customers without support
        contracts may now obtain security patches,"recommended" patches, 
        and patch lists via SunSolve Online.
  
     Sun does not furnish patches to any external distribution sites
     other than the ones mentioned here. The ftp.uu.net and ftp.eu.net
     sites are no longer supported.
 
     3. About the checksums
 
     So that you can quickly verify the integrity of the patch files
     themselves, we supply in each bulletin checksums for the tar 
     archives.

     Occasionally, you may find that the listed checksums do not match
     the patches on the SunSolve or SunSite database. This does not
     necessarily mean that the patch has been tampered with. More 
     likely, a non-substantive change (such as a revision to the README file)
     has altered the checksum of the tar file. The SunSolve patch 
     database is refreshed nightly, and will sometimes contain versions of a 
     patch newer than the one on which the checksums were based.
 
     In the future we may provide checksum information for the
     individual components of a patch as well as the compressed 
     archive file. This would allow customers to determine, if need be, 
     which file(s) have been changed since we issued the bulletin containing
     the checksums.
 
     In the meantime, if you would like assistance in verifying the
     integrity of a patch file please contact this office or your 
     local answer center.
 
 
B.   How to report or inquire about Sun security problems
 
If you discover a security problem with Sun software or wish to
inquire about a possible problem, contact one or more of the
following:
     
    - Your local Sun answer centers
    - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT 
    - This office. Address postal mail to:
  
          Sun Security Coordinator
          MS MPK17-103
          2550 Garcia Avenue 
          Mountain View, CA 94043-1100
         
          Phone: 415-786-5274
          Fax:   415-786-7994
          E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
     
We strongly recommend that you report problems to your local Answer
Center. In some cases they will accept a report of a security bug
even if you do not have a support contract. An additional notification
to the security-alert alias is suggested but should not be used as 
your primary vehicle for reporting a bug.
 
 
C.   How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates
 
     1. Subscription information Sun Security Bulletins are available free of
        charge as part of our Customer Warning System. It is not necessary to 
        have a Sun support contract in order to receive them.
 
     To receive information or to subscribe or unsubscribe from our
     mailing list, send mail to security-alert@sun.com with a subject
     line containing one of the following commands.
         
 
         Subject         Information Returned/Action Taken
         -------         ---------------------------------
 
         HELP            An explanation of how to get information
 
         LIST            A list of current security topics
 
         QUERY [topic]   The mail containing the question is relayed 
                         to a Security Coordinator for a response.

         REPORT [topic]  The mail containing the text is treated as a
                         security bug report and forwarded to a Security
                         Coordinator for handling. Please note that this
                         channel of communications does not supersede
                         the use of Sun Solution Centers for this
                         purpose.  Note also that we do not recommend
                         that detailed problem descriptions be sent in
                         plain text.
 
         SEND topic      Summary of the status of selected topic. (To
                         retrieve a Sun Security Bulletin, supply the
                         number of the bulletin, as in "SEND #103".)
 
         SUBSCRIBE       Sender is added to the CWS (Customer Warning System)
	 		 list.  The subscribe feature requires that the sender
			 include on the subject line the word "cws" and the 
		 	 reply email address.  So the subject line might look 
			 like the following:

                                 SUBSCRIBE cws graff@sun.com
 
         UNSUBSCRIBE     Sender is removed from the CWS list.
 
     
     Should your email not fit into one of the above subjects, a help
     message will be returned to you.
 
     Due to the volume of subscription requests we receive, we cannot
     guarantee to acknowledge requests. Please contact this office if
     you wish to verify that your subscription request was received, or
     if you would like your bulletin delivered via postal mail or fax.
 
     2. Obtaining old bulletins
 
     Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert alias
     and on SunSolve. Please try these sources first before contacting
     this office for old bulletins.
 
                                 ------------
 
 [ End of SUN Bulletin ]
 
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 
ASSIST would like to thank Sun Microsystems for information contained 
in this bulletin.
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 

 
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ASSIST is an element of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA), and provides service to the entire DoD community. 
Constituents of the DoD with questions about ASSIST or computer 
security issues, can contact ASSIST using one of the methods listed 
below.  Non-DoD organizations/institutions, contact the Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) representative.  To 
obtain a list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies 
send an email to docserver@first.org with an empty "subject" line 
and a message body containing the line "send first-contacts".
 
ASSIST Information Resources: To be included in the distribution
list for the ASSIST bulletins, send your Milnet (Internet) e-mail
address to assist-request@assist.mil.  Back issues of ASSIST 
bulletins, and other security related information, are available
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FTP from assist.mil (IP address 199.211.123.11).  Note: assist.mil 
will only accept anonymous FTP connections from Milnet addresses 
that are registered with the NIC or DNS.  If your system is not 
registered, you must provide your MILNET IP address to ASSIST before 
access can be provided.
 
ASSIST Contact Information:
PHONE: 800-357-4231, COMM 703-607-4700, DSN 327-4700.
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ASSIST uses Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 2.6.2 as the digital 
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Security, Inc.  A copy of that license is available via anonymous

FTP from net-dist.mit.edu (IP 18.72.0.3) in the file 
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http://net-dist.mit.edu/pgp.html.  In accordance with the terms 
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attached to the end of ASSIST bulletins.
  
Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or
service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does
not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or
favoring by ASSIST.  The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement
purposes.

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