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Date: Wed, 3 Jul 1996 19:12:37 -0500 (CDT)
From: Oliver Friedrichs <iceman@MBnet.MB.CA>
To: sneakers@CS.YALE.EDU
Subject: World Star Holdings Inc. challenge
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VPAGE
~~~~~

The product which is being developed by World Star Holdings Inc. is known
as VPAGE.  VPAGE is essentially a package designed to allow dynamic
creation of web pages when a user selects a link on their server.
Before delivering the web page to the user, security checks are done to
ensure that the user is an authorized user.

To support this dynamic delivery of web pages, an interpretive language
known as MAPOL was developed.  For each page, instead of having regular
html documents, there are scripts which generate the page, after
performing security checks.  These scripts have an .mpl extension.

The breakin
~~~~~~~~~~~

The hostname of the challenge server (205.200.247.10) was obtained via
snmp.  The hostname obtained was ZEUS.

Using samba, it was easy to obtain a listing of filesystems which were
being exported (now that we knew the hostname).

# ./smbclient -L ZEUS -I 205.200.247.10

Initially on June 13, the following directories were directly mountable
on host 205.200.247.10.  The complete contents of these directories were
accessible and easily modified by any user on the internet.  (Not actual
samba output, rather a DIR command).

DOORCO~1     <DIR>     06-11-96   3:56p^M
HTML         <DIR>     06-13-96   4:04a^M
INI          <DIR>     06-13-96   3:04p^M
SCRIPTS      <DIR>     06-13-96   9:08a^M
SECURE       <DIR>     06-13-96   3:05p^M

These directories were accessible via the netbios service, which offered
unrestricted, unpassworded access to the system directories.

Somewhere during the day of June 13, access was lost to the scripts and
ini directories, however it remained for the html directory which contained
html pages offered by the server.

Windows NT does not easily allow any interaction with the operating
system without having the system operator install a daemon to support
this interaction.  The dynamic design of VPAGE and the MAPOL scripting
language made is possible to execute any Windows NT shell command,
and obtain the output.

The MAPOL language has an option to execute a shell command with the
following syntax:

PRINT SHELL("COMMAND.COM /C DIR /S C:\")

By simply placing a .mpl script onto the server, it was possible to
cause VPAGE to execute this script.  VPAGE only looks in the scripts
directory, however it was easily possible to force VPAGE to execute
our own script in any other directory via:

http://205.200.247.10/vpage3.exe?..\html\script.mpl

When originally entering the challenge site via the initial web page,
one is presented with a locked bank vault which requires an "account
number" to pass through.

The 101 digit account number to pass through the bank vault door was
obtained by replacing a script called 'verify.mpl' which was originally
used to compare the code entered by the user, with the passcode on the
server.  The verify.mpl script was modified to print out the passcode,
and to succeed even if it was incorrect.

At the bank teller window, one was presented with the following text:

'You have 10(ten) tries to break into an account in a 24 hour period.
 You must then wait 24 hours before you are eligible to try again.'

The code obtained was:

dkl14234rf3ew344idfr3j23qrfwojowqjoijo3481379491281
klj318912jo3j981oij3198u3k9ualsdjlkj289u492yaright

After entering the code correctly, one was presented with a web page
with the following text:

'CONGRATULATIONS!!!

Please present the following statement to Ameritel....
342423421237678679didn'tthinkyouwouldmakeittohere'

No list of product codes and prizes were easily availible - perhaps
hidden on another server and not referenced by this server.  Any
information stored on and passed by this server can be compromised
in this case, if stored in encrypted form, it would still have to
be unencrypted at some point.

Within a day of contacting World Star Holdings Inc. this page was
changed, and then stated:

'CONGRATULATIONS!!! You've made it through the entrance door!
   This establishes that you've got what it takes to take the
   CyberTest'96 Challenge.
   Good Luck!'

(Which it will still state now when the 101 digit code is entered)

No, the VPAGE software itself was not breached (however we have analyzed
the software, and have come up with possible entry points).
The entry points were weaknesses in their system setup - ones which
anyone could have exploited with minimal knowledge of networking.

I hereby certify that the above description is true, and that there are
many reliable witnesses which can account for these events.  A complete
directory tree is availible which contains a listing of all files
(including operating system) which were present on the system at the
time of the breach.  The actually breach occured from 00:01 A.M.
June 14 until 5:00 A.M. June 14.

Following is a listing of the root C:\ directory on the challenge
server:

 Volume in drive C has no label
 Volume Serial Number is 9C3B-5A58

Directory of C:\

AMERITEL     <DIR>     06-14-96   4:01a
ARJ      EXE    104614 01-19-92  11:51p
AUTOEXEC BAT        42 06-11-96   9:17a
COMMAND  COM     92870 07-11-95   9:50a
CONFIG   SYS        19 06-11-96   9:16a
EMM386   EXE    125495 07-11-95   9:50a
FTP          <DIR>     06-11-96   3:03p
FTP_LOG      <DIR>     06-11-96   3:03p
HAL      DLL     48416 05-26-95   4:57a
HIMEM    SYS     32935 07-11-95   9:50a
HTTP_LOG     <DIR>     06-12-96  12:15a
I386         <DIR>     06-11-96   9:24a
INI_FI~1     <DIR>     06-11-96   4:58p
MOUSE    COM     56408 03-10-93   6:00a
MOUSE    INI        53 12-21-94  12:06a
PAGEFILE SYS  45088768 06-12-96   1:50p
SMARTDRV EXE     45145 08-22-95   9:39a
TEMP         <DIR>     06-13-96   1:36p
USERS        <DIR>     06-11-96   1:20p
WIN32APP     <DIR>     06-11-96   1:20p
WINNT35      <DIR>     06-12-96   1:50p
       21 file(s)   45594765 bytes

10-15 people were present when the correct account number was entered
and the congratulations page was displayed.  All web pages were
printed out at the time they were displayed.

I have been told that this completes 1/5th of the challange.

I have been offered $500 by World Star Holdings Inc. however have
not as of yet received payment.

Oliver Friedrichs

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Oliver Friedrichs <iceman@MBnet.MB.CA>         MBnet System Administrator   
       "UNIX doesn't have bugs, it just develops random features" 

