Center for High Assurance Computing Systems (CHACS) Publications

<Title>CHACS Publications</Title>

<H1>Center for High Assurance Computing Systems (CHACS) Publications</H1>


<H2>1991</H2>
Gray, James ``On Information Flow Security Models,'' Proc. IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV, IEEE Press, 1991.
<P>

Gray, James ``Toward a Mathematical Foundation for Information Flow
Security,'' Proc. 1991 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE
Press, 1991.
<P>

McDermott, J., S. Jajodia, and R. Sandhu, "A Single-Level
   Scheduler for the Replicated Architecture for Multilevel-Secure
   Databases", Proc.  7th Annual Computer Security Applications
   Conference, San Antonio, December 1991, pp. 2-11.
   <a href="1991mcdermott-acsac.ps">
    PostScript</a>

<blockquote>
The replicated architecture for multilevel secure database systems
provides security by replicating data into separate untrusted
single-level database systems. To be successful, a system using the
replicated architecture must have a concurrency and replica control
algorithm that does not introduce any covert channels. Jajodia and
Kogan have developed one such algorithm that uses update projections
and a write-all replica control algorithm. The new algorithm uses
replicated transactions, and a set of queues organized according to
security class. A new definition of correctness is require for this
approach, so we present one and use it to show that our algorithm is
correct. The existence of this new algorithm increases the viability of
the replicated architecture as an alternative to kernelized
approaches.
</blockquote>Moskowitz, Ira ``Analysis of a Storage Channel in the Two-Phase Commit
Protocol,'' (with O. Costich)  Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop IV, IEEE Press, 1991. 
<P>

Moskowitz, Ira ``Variable Noise Effects upon a Simple Timing Channel,''
Proc. 1991 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, IEEE
Press, 1991. 
<P>
Paul Syverson,
``The Use of Logic in the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols,''
Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, Oakland CA May 1991 IEEE CS Press (Los Alamitos CA, 1991)

<blockquote>
Logics for cryptographic protocol analysis are discussed and a study
is made of the protocol features that they are appropirate for analyzing:
some are appropriate for analyzing trust, others security. The goals
of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham's BAN logic are examined, and it is found that
there is confusion about these. Formal semantics is explored as a
reasoning tool and the importance of soundness and completeness for
protocol security is discussed. The logic KPL is used
to resolve a debate over an alleged flaw in BAN logic.
</blockquote>