__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN NeoScale Systems CryptoStor 700 Series Appliances Vulnerability [US-CERT Vulnerability VU#339004] December 19, 2006 19:00 GMT Number R-083 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: An attacker with knowledge of only the username and password for the administration contols can gain administrative access to the CryptoStor unit. PLATFORM: CryptoStor Tape 700 Series Firmware version before 2.6 DAMAGE: An attacker with knowledge of only the username and password for the administrative console can gain administrative access by using a browser with ActiveX disabled. This would allow an attacker to add, change, or delete encryption rules and keys, establish cluster members, export keys for archival, and more. SOLUTION: Upgrade to version 2.6 CryptoStor Tape 700 Series Firmware. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. administrative console can gain ASSESSMENT: administrative access by using a browser with ActiveX disabled. This would allow an attacker to add, change, or delete encryption rules and keys, establish cluster members, export keys for archival, and more. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/r-083.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#339004 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/339004 CVE: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name= CVE-2006-3896 ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start US-CERT Vulnerability VU#339004 *****] Vulnerability Note VU#339004 NeoScale Systems CryptoStor 700 series appliances fail to properly perform two-factor authentication Overview NeoScale Systems CryptoStor 700 series appliances fail to properly perform two-factor authentication. This can make it easier to bypass the CryptoStor authentication process. I. Description NeoScale Systems CryptoStor Tape units are tape backup encryption appliances. CryptoStor 700 series units provide two-factor authentication for administration functions. This is accomplished with a smartcard token plus a username and password combination. The smartcard aspect of the two-factor authentication is performed on the client side within the web browser, using ActiveX and script. Disabling ActiveX can bypass this part of the two-factor authentication. II. Impact An attacker with knowledge of only the username and password for the administration console can gain administrative access to the CryptoStor unit. This would allow an attacker to add, change, or delete encryption rules and keys, establish cluster members, export keys for archival, and more. III. Solution Apply an update This issue is addressed in the 2.6 version of the CryptoStor Tape 700 Series firmware. According to NeoScale, this version of the firmware makes the following changes: a) changing the CryptoStor ActiveX component to not perform the actual authentication only to report on its success or failure. The CryptoStor ActiveX component version number was also changed. b) changes to the cgi-bin program within the CryptoStor Appliance to perform the actual authentication. The cgi-bin program was also modified to not work with the original version of the CryptoStor ActiveX component c) implementation of a Thawte certificate for the CryptoStor ActiveX component Systems Affected Vendor Status Date Updated NeoScale Systems, Inc. Vulnerable 18-Dec-2006 References http://www.neoscale.com/English/Products/CryptoStor_Tape.html Credit This document was written by Will Dormann. Other Information Date Public 12/18/2006 Date First Published 12/18/2006 05:13:18 PM Date Last Updated 12/18/2006 CERT Advisory CVE Name CVE-2006-3896 Metric 0.64 Document Revision 10 [***** End US-CERT Vulnerability VU#339004 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of US-CERT for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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