__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Buffer Overflow in the format(1M) Command [Sun Alert ID: 102519] August 22, 2006 19:00 GMT Number Q-291 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: There is a security vulnerability in the format(1M) command. PLATFORM: Solaris 8, 9, 10 Operating System DAMAGE: The execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the root user. SOLUTION: Upgrade to the appropriate version. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. It may be possible for a user who has been ASSESSMENT: granted the "File System Management" RBAC profile (or any custom profile which would allow the user to run the format(1M) command with root privileges) to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the root user. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/q-291.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: Sun Alert ID: 102519 http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1 -26-102519-1&searchclause=%22category:security%22%2420 %22availability,%2420security%22%2420category:security CVE: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name= ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun Alert ID: 102519 *****] Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 102519 Synopsis: Security Vulnerability Due to Buffer Overflow in The format(1M) Command May Allow Privilege Elevation For Certain RBAC Profiles Category: Security Product: Solaris 9 Operating System, Solaris 10 Operating System, Solaris 8 Operating System BugIDs: 6296988 Avoidance: Patch, Workaround State: Resolved Date Released: 21-Aug-2006 Date Closed: 21-Aug-2006 Date Modified: 1. Impact Due to a security vulnerability in the format(1M) command, it may be possible for a user who has been granted the "File System Management" RBAC profile (or any custom profile which would allow the user to run the format(1M) command with root privileges) to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the root user. 2. Contributing Factors This issue can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 8 without patch 108975-10 Solaris 9 without patch 113072-08 Solaris 10 without patch 118833-18 x86 Platform Solaris 8 without patch 108976-10 Solaris 9 without patch 114423-07 Solaris 10 without patch 118997-09 Note: This issue is only present when at least one non-root user on the system has been granted a profile allowing them to run the format(1M) command with root privileges, for example the "File System Management" profile. The assignment of profiles to users is configured in the user_attr(4) database. If the host is configured to only use a local file for this database, user's with the "File System Management" profile could be identified with a command such as the following: $ grep 'File System Management' /etc/user_attr For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the user_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ldap(1), ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). To determine if an individual user has been granted the profile, the profiles(1) command can be used: $ profiles testuser | grep 'File System Management' The above command will produce no output if the user has not been granted the profile. If the host is configured to only use a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, a command similar to the following can be run to determine which profiles grant privileged access to the format(1M) utility: $ grep format /etc/security/exec_attr File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0 For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). 3. Symptoms There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate the described issue has been exploited. Solution Summary Top 4. Relief/Workaround The issue described in this Sun Alert only affects users who have been granted a profile which gives privileged access to the format(1M) command, such as the "File System Management" profile. To workaround this issue until patches can be applied, remove references to the format command from the exec_attr(4) database. This will result in those users no longer being granted privileged access to the format command. For example, if the host is configured to only use a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, a "#" symbol can be inserted at the beginning of lines in the "/etc/security/exec_attr" file which reference the "format" command: $ grep /usr/sbin/format /etc/security/exec_attr #File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0 For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)). 5. Resolution This issue is addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform Solaris 8 with patch 108975-10 or later Solaris 9 with patch 113072-08 or later Solaris 10 with patch 118833-18 or later x86 Platform Solaris 8 with patch 108976-10 or later Solaris 9 with patch 114423-07 or later Solaris 10 with patch 118997-09 or later This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. Copyright 2000-2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved. [***** End Sun Alert ID: 102519 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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