__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SSL Certificate Validation Vulnerability in IDS Management Software [Document ID: 66142] August 22, 2005 18:00 GMT Number P-284 [REVISED 24 AUG 2005] ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A malicious attacker may be able to spoof a Cisco Intrusion Detection Sensor (IDS), or Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) by exploiting a vulnerability in the SSL certificate checking functionality. PLATFORM: IDSMC version 2.0 and version 2.1 CiscoWorks Monitoring Center for Security (Security Monitor or Secmon) version 1.1 through version 2.0 and version 2.1. DAMAGE: The attacker may be able to gather login credentials, submit false data to IDSMC and Secmon or filter legitimate data from IDSMC and Secmon. SOLUTION: Upgrade to current version. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is LOW. The attacker may be able to gather login ASSESSMENT: credentials or compromise the integrity of the alert data. This can only be exploited through the management port, which is typically only accessible from the inside of the perimeter. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/p-284.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps4077/ products_security_advisory09186a00804fa92e.shtml ADDITIONAL LINKS: Cisco Security Advisories and Notices http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_ advisory09186a00804fa92e.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ REVISION HISTORY: 08/24/2005 - added a link to Cisco Security Advisories Document ID: 66142 [***** Start Document ID: 66142 *****] Cisco Security Advisory: SSL Certificate Validation Vulnerability in IDS Management Software Revision 1.1 For Public Release 2005 August 24 1700 UTC (GMT) ========================================================================= Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Obtaining Fixed Software Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures +---------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= CiscoWorks Management Center for IDS Sensors (IDSMC) is a network security software agent that provides configuration and signature management for Cisco Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention systems. A separate but closely related product, Monitoring Center for Security (Security Monitor or Secmon), provides event collection, viewing, and reporting capability for network devices. A malicious attacker may be able to spoof a Cisco Intrusion Detection Sensor (IDS), or Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) by exploiting a vulnerability in the SSL certificate checking functionality in IDSMC and Secmon. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050824-idsmc.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ * IDSMC version 2.0 and version 2.1. * CiscoWorks Monitoring Center for Security (Security Monitor or Secmon) version 1.1 through version 2.0 and version 2.1. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- * IDSMC versions 1.0 thru 1.2 * CiscoWorks Monitoring Center for Security (Security Monitor or Secmon) version 1.0 No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by vulnerability. Details ======= A malicious attacker may be able to spoof an IDS or IPS by exploiting a vulnerability in the SSL certificate checking functionality in IDSMC and Secmon. SSL certificates are used to secure and authenticate IDS and IPS sensors, thereby ensuring safe communication across your network. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCsa50100 and CSCsb57379. Impact ====== If exploited, the attacker may be able to gather login credentials, submit false data to IDSMC and Secmon or filter legitimate data from IDSMC and Secmon, thus impacting the integrity of the device and the reporting capabilities of it. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== This issue is addressed in Service Pack 1 for IPSMC 2.1 and Security Monitor 2.1. This service pack is available for download at http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/mgmt-ctr-ids-app This service pack provides monitoring of certificate information and provides logged messages when the certificate changes for any reason for both IDSMC and Secmon. In addition to logging certificate changes, this service pack allows Secmon to optionally drop the connection should the certificate change. Revision 2.2 of IPSMC will provide the option to drop the connection between the sensor and IPSMC should the certificate change. This release is anticipated to be available in late 2005. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades. See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Workarounds =========== As a security best practice, you should always configure your IPS device with a list of trusted hosts or networks that you want to have access to the IPS sensor. For more information on setting up IPS access lists so that only trusted hosted and networks may access the sensor, please see http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2113/products_ configuration_guide_chapter09186a008045a77c.html#wp1031536 Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. Cisco would like to thank Jan Bervar at NIL Data Communications for bringing this to our attention. Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050824-idsmc.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ Revision 1.1 2005-August 24 Fixed link to advisory in Summary section. Revision 1.0 2005-August 22 Initial public release. Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- All contents are Copyright © 1992-2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Important Notices and Privacy Statement. [***** End Document ID: 66142 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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