__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Real Networks Streaming Server Vulnerability September 18, 2003 17:00 GMT Number N-152 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: CIAC has information that the Real Networks Helix Universal Server and RealSystems Servers are vulnerable to a root compromise. SYSTEMS: Helix Universal Server 9.01, 9.0.2.794 RealSystem Server 8.0 and 7.0 DAMAGE: A carefully crafted request to the server could give an intruder root access. SOLUTION: Upgrade to Helix Universal Server 9.0.2.802 or remove the View Source plugin from the plugins directory and restart the server. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. A remote intruder can get root access. ASSESSMENT: ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-152.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: NOTE: Original and an updated bulletin both included below http://www.service.real.com/help/faq/security/rootexploit 082203.html ______________________________________________________________________________ [****** Start RealNetworks Bulletin 8/22/03 ******] Server Exploit Vulnerability Updated August 22, 2003 Helix Universal Server 9 and earlier versions (RealSystem Server 8, 7 and RealServer G2) are vulnerable to a root exploit when certain types of character strings appear in large numbers within URLs destined for the Server's protocol parsers. RealNetworks Proxy products are not vulnerable to this exploit. Solution: This exploit solution updated September 11, 2003. RealNetworks has verified that vulnerability to this exploit can be effectively closed by removing the RealNetworks View Source plug-in from the /Plugins directory and restarting the Server process. * UNIX/Linux: vsrcplin.so.9.0 (Helix Universal Server), vsrcplin.so.6.0 (RealSystem Server 8 & 7, and RealServer G2). * Windows: vsrc3260.dll The View Source Plug-in is responsible for reading and displaying file format headers of media files accessible to the file systems loaded by the Server. Removal of this plug-in will not hinder on-demand or live streaming delivery or logging and authentication services of the product. With the plug-in removed however, the Content Browsing feature will be disabled. RealNetworks considers the removal of the View Source Plug-in a work-around for this issue, we will be making a new version of the Helix Universal Server available to all current customers that resolves this problem and does not require system administrators to remove any shipping components post installation. Once the new version is available, RealNetworks will urge customer to upgrade. We want to thank those who posted information about this problem on http://www.securityfocus.org/. Warranty: While RealNetworks endeavors to provide you with the highest quality products and services, we cannot guarantee and do not warrant that the operation of any RealNetworks product will be error-free, uninterrupted or secure. See your original license agreement for details of our limited warranty or warranty disclaimer. [****** End RealNetworks Bulletin ******] [****** Start RealNetworks Bulletin Updated 9/11/03 ******] Server Exploit Fix Updated September 11, 2003 On August 22, 2003 RealNetworks reported that Helix Universal Server 9 and earlier versions (RealSystem Server 8, 7 and RealServer G2) were vulnerable to a root exploit when certain types of character strings appeared in large numbers within URLs destined for the Server's protocol parsers. RealNetworks Proxy products were not vulnerable to this exploit. Affected Software: Helix Universal Server 9.01, versions 9.0.2.794 and earlier RealSystem Server 8.0 & 7.0 Solution: Customers are encouraged to upgrade their Server software to the latest version which contains a security patch. On September 10, 2003 RealNetworks publicly released new installation binaries that guard against improperly formed URL from causing a buffer overrun within data structures that store resources file names within the Server. Helix Server customers are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version of the Helix Universal Server. This will require reinstallation of the software, however, all existing configuration settings (rmserver.cfg file) will function without modification with this new build. (see notes below). Any previously provided and current (non-expired) 9.0.x product license will enable this upgrade. To preserve the Helix configuration file: The rmserver.cfg file will be renamed "rmserver.cfg.bak" by the installer, and a new rmserver.cfg file will be installed. In order to maintain your previous Helix Server configurations, you should rename or discard the newly installed "rmserver.cfg" file, and rename "rmserver.cfg.bak" to "rmserver.cfg". Execute or restart the Helix Server to read this configuration information. All actively supported Helix Universal Server platforms are available: Compaq FreeBSD HP UX IBM AIX Linux Sun Solaris 2.7 Sun Solaris 2.8 Windows The latest version is: Helix Universal Server 9.01 Security Update Version: 9.0.2.802 Platform and configuration support details are available at http://www.realnetworks.com/resources/contentdelivery/server/recommended_ platforms.html If you are an Server 8.0x customer, please contact Customer Service. Server 7, 6 and G2 are not supported servers and have not been patched. Please contact sales or Customer Service for information about upgrading. Acknowledgement: RealNetworks wishes to thank those who posted information about this problem on http://www.securityfocus.com/. Warranty: While RealNetworks endeavors to provide you with the highest quality products and services, we cannot guarantee and do not warrant that the operation of any RealNetworks product will be error-free, uninterrupted or secure. See your original license agreement for details of our limited warranty or warranty disclaimer. [****** End RealNetworks Bulletin ******] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of RealNetworks for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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