__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft Unchecked Buffer in MDAC Function Vulnerability [Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-033] August 20, 2003 22:00 GMT Number N-136 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) provides the underlying functionality for a number of database operations, such as connecting to remote databases and returning data to a client. For example, when a client system on a network tries to see a list of computers that are running SQL Server and that reside on the network, it sends a broadcast request to all the devices that are on the network. Due to a flaw in a specific MDAC component, an attacker could respond to this request with a specially crafted packet that could cause a buffer overflow. SOFTWARE: Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 MDAC is included by default in Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows ME. Windows 2003 Server is not vulnerable. DAMAGE: Run code of the attacker's choice. SOLUTION: Apply patch as stated in Microsoft's bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. MDAC is commonly included by default in ASSESSMENT: many versions of Windows. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-136.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp? url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-033.asp ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-033 *****] Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-033 Unchecked Buffer in MDAC Function Could Enable System Compromise (823718) Originally posted: August 20, 2003 Summary Who should read this bulletin: Customers using Microsoft® Windows® Impact of vulnerability: Run code of the attacker’s choice Maximum Severity Rating: Important Recommendation: Users should apply the security patch to affected systems. Affected Software: * Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 * Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 * Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 Not Affected Software: * Microsoft Data Access Components 2.8 An End User version of the bulletin is available at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms03-033.asp. Technical details Technical description: Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) is a collection of components that are used to provide database connectivity on Windows platforms. MDAC is a ubiquitous technology, and it is likely to be present on most Windows systems: * By default, MDAC is included by default as part of Microsoft Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows Millennium Edition, and Windows Server 2003. (It is worth noting, though, that the version that is installed by Windows Server 2003 does not have this vulnerability). * MDAC is available for download as a stand-alone technology. * MDAC is either included in or installed by a number of other products and technologies. For example, MDAC is included in the Microsoft Windows NT® 4.0 Option Pack and in Microsoft SQL Server 2000. Additionally, some MDAC components are present as part of Microsoft Internet Explorer even when MDAC itself is not installed. MDAC provides the underlying functionality for a number of database operations, such as connecting to remote databases and returning data to a client. When a client system on a network tries to see a list of computers that are running SQL Server and that reside on the network, it sends a broadcast request to all the devices that are on the network. Due to a flaw in a specific MDAC component, an attacker could respond to this request with a specially crafted packet that could cause a buffer overflow. An attacker who successfully exploited this flaw could gain the same level of privileges over the system as the application that initiated the broadcast request. The actions an attacker could carry out would be dependent on the permissions which the application using MDAC ran under. If the application ran with limited privileges, an attacker would be limited accordingly; however, if the application ran under the local system context, the attacker would have the same level of permissions. This could include creating, modifying, or deleting data on the system, or reconfiguring the system. This could also include reformatting the hard disk or running programs of the attacker’s choice. This bulletin supercedes the patch discussed in MS02-040. Customers should install this patch as it contains both the fix for the vulnerability discussed in bulletin MS02-040 and the patch discussed in this bulletin. Mitigating factors: * For an attack to be successful an attacker would need to simulate a SQL server on the same subnet as the target system. * Code executed on the client system would only run under the privileges of the client application that made the broadcast request. * MDAC version 2.8 (which is the version included with Windows Server 2003) does not contain the flaw that is addressed by this bulletin. Severity Rating: MDAC 2.5 Important ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ MDAC 2.6 Important ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ MDAC 2.7 Important ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would have on them. Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2003-0353 Tested Versions: Microsoft tested Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 to assess whether they are affected by this vulnerability. Previous versions are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these vulnerabilities. Patch availability Download locations for this patch * MDAC: All affected versions Additional information about this patch Installation platforms: This patch can be installed on systems running: * MDAC 2.5 Service Pack 2 * MDAC 2.5 Service Pack 3 * MDAC 2.6 Service Pack 2 * MDAC 2.7 * MDAC 2.7 Service Pack 1 Inclusion in future service packs: The fix for this issue will be included in MDAC 2.5 Service Pack 5 and in MDAC 2.7 Service Pack 2. Reboot needed: Yes Patch can be uninstalled: No Superseded patches: This patch supersedes the patch discussed in MS02-040. Verifying patch installation: * Microsoft Knowledge Base article 823718 provides a file manifest that can be used to verify the patch installation. Caveats: None Localization: Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in “Patch Availability”. Obtaining other security patches: Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations: * Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch". * Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site Other information: Acknowledgments Microsoft thanks Microsoft thanks Aaron C. Newman of Application Security, Inc. for reporting this issue to us and for working with us to help protect customers. Support: * Microsoft Knowledge Base article 823718 discusses this issue and will be available approximately 24 hours after the release of this bulletin. Knowledge Base articles can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site. * Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There is no charge for support calls associated with security patches. Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional information about security in Microsoft products. Disclaimer: The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. Revisions: * V1.0 (August 20, 2003): Bulletin Created. [***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-033 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) N-126: Microsoft Unchecked Buffer in DirectX Could Enable System Compromise N-127: Buffer Overflows in EXTPROC of Oracle Database Server N-128: Oracle Buffer Overflow in E-Business Suite N-129: Oracle Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in E-Business Suite N-130: SGI IRIX nsd Server AUTH_UNIX gid list Vulnerability N-131: Sun Solaris Runtime Linker ld.so.1(1) Vulnerability N-132: Red Hat wu-ftpd Buffer Overflow Vulnerability N-133: Blaster Worm (aka: W32.Blaster, MSBlast, Lovsan, Win32.Poza) N-134: Sun cachefs Patches May Overwrite inetd.conf File N-135: Microsoft Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer