__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX lpd Daemon Vulnerabilities via sendmail and dns [SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P] November 15, 2002 19:00 GMT Number N-015 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A flaw exists in the authentication method of the lpd daemon that could permit remote access to the server by sending options to sendmail. AFFECTED ldp Daemon SOFTWARE: DAMAGE: Remote attackers could resolve their IP address to the printer's hostname and then escalate privileges and possibly gain root access. SOLUTION: SGI recommends upgrading to IRIX 6.5.19, or install appropriate patches. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. The lpd/dns vulnerability could be ASSESSMENT: exploited by a remote user and can be used to work around lpd's security mechanisms. However, a local account on the system would be required to be successful. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-015.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/ 20021104-01-P ADDITIONAL http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/30308 INFORMATION: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/39001 ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P *****] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI Security Advisory Title : IRIX lpd daemon vulnerabilities via sendmail and dns Number : 20021104-01-P Date : November 12, 2002 Reference: CERT VU#30308 Reference: CERT VU#39001 Reference: SGI BUGS 864917 and 865485 Fixed in : IRIX 6.5.19 Fixed in : SGI PATCH 4835 ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- It's been reported that the IRIX lpd daemon has vulnerabilities related to dns and sendmail. See: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/30308 and: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/39001 ...for additional details on these vulnerabilities. No CVE candidates were assigned by CERT for these issues. The lpd / dns vulnerability can be exploited by a remote user and can be used to work around lpd's security mechanisms, but the lpd / sendmail vulnerability requires a local account on the system and can be used to gain root access. SGI has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. These issues have been corrected in future releases of IRIX. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The /usr/etc/lpd binary is not installed by default on IRIX 6.5 systems. It is part of the optional print.sw.bsdlpr printing package. To determine the version of IRIX you are running, execute the following command: # /bin/uname -R That will return a result similar to the following: # 6.5 6.5.16f The first number ("6.5") is the release name, the second ("6.5.16f" in this case) is the extended release name. The extended release name is the "version" we refer to throughout this document. To see if lpd is installed, execute the following command: $ versions print.sw.bsdlpr I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I print 07/15/2002 Printing Tools, Release 1.15.5f I print.sw 07/15/2002 Printing Tools Software 1.15.5f I print.sw.bsdlpr 07/15/2002 Berkeley 'lpr' Printer Spooler If the output is similar to that shown above, then lpd is installed and the system may be vulnerable. - ---------------------------- - --- Temporary Workaround --- - ---------------------------- SGI understands that there are times when upgrading the operating system or installing patches are inconvenient or not possible. In those instances, we recommend the following workaround. Uninstall the bsd printing system and use the System V (lp) system instead. The IRIX lp system understands and accepts bsd printing commands. $ su - # versions remove print.sw.bsdlpr You will then need to configure your printers under the System V lp system. It is not necessary to reboot the system after using this workaround. - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- SGI has provided a series of patches for these vulnerabilities. Our recommendation is to upgrade to IRIX 6.5.19 when available, or install the appropriate patch. OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1 IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1 IRIX 5.x unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.2 unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.3 unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.4 unknown Note 1 IRIX 6.5 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.1 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.2 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.3 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.4 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.5 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.6 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.7 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.8 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.9 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.10 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.11 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.12 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.13 yes Notes 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5.14m yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.14f yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.15m yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.15f yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.16m yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.16f yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.17m yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.17f yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.18m yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.18f yes 4835 IRIX 6.5.19 no NOTES 1) This version of the IRIX operating has been retired. Upgrade to an actively supported IRIX operating system. See http://support.sgi.com/irix/news/index.html#policy for more information. 2) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.X CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your SGI Support Provider or URL: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/ IRIX Maintenance releases can be downloaded from: http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html 3) Upgrade to IRIX 6.5.19 when it is released. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.4835 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05603 8 README.patch.4835 Algorithm #2 (sum): 28528 8 README.patch.4835 MD5 checksum: 7A7B340C28EE2818D77296F1D3305F67 Filename: patchSG0004835 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32912 3 patchSG0004835 Algorithm #2 (sum): 19629 3 patchSG0004835 MD5 checksum: BC092B72061F4724E2EB176B61E3DD69 Filename: patchSG0004835.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 65140 3 patchSG0004835.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 31061 3 patchSG0004835.idb MD5 checksum: 8C51E0B1EB1A6827FCC211C15DABB456 Filename: patchSG0004835.print_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45169 263 patchSG0004835.print_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 38519 263 patchSG0004835.print_sw MD5 checksum: CB4ADD4EFA7905446C2FE4FCAC237AFE - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments ---- - ------------------------ SGI wishes to thank the USAF, CERT, FIRST and the users of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter. - ------------- - --- Links --- - ------------- SGI Security Advisories can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/ SGI Security Patches can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/ SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/ SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at: http://freeware.sgi.com/ SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on: http://oss.sgi.com/projects/ SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/ SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/nt/ IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/ IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/ The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not do a real-time update. - ----------------------------------------- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. ------oOo------ SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/ The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL: http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ . ------oOo------ If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be sent to security-info@sgi.com. For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBPdF9UbQ4cFApAP75AQEp0gQAkLGZjyH1vug+s6z3us4yDiY5xbrJc7NH a+Ejs5DVTS+WlAuHk68eMI8M+RjaRHugc4aWbAe1Z6w8s7DpbNASJ17viFDqYGVa 60YnijyvPzTadzSAbIgZ11XJEGNODrt06NyCN3/f139UF13iCRTepEfwaDNOLGO4 zyoxJVRs8TU= =11M4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE- [***** End SGI Security Advisory 20021104-01-P *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. and CERT Coordination Center for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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