__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Center ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft Windows NT/2000 Trust Domain Vulnerability [Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-001] January 31, 2002 23:00 GMT Number M-036 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A trusting domain does not verify that the trusted domain is actually authoritative for all the Security Identifiers (SIDs) in the authorization data. PLATFORM: Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000 DAMAGE: If an attacker inserted SIDs of his choice into the authorization data at the trusted domain, he could elevate his privileges to those associated with any desired user or group, including the Domain Administrators group for the trusting domain. SOLUTION: Review the Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS02-001) and deploy SID filtering on domain controllers where appropriate. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is LOW. The attacker would need to have domain ASSESSMENT: administrative privileges in the trusted domain. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-036.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-001.asp ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-001 *****] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: Trusting Domains Do Not Verify Domain Membership of SIDs in Authorization Data Date: 30 January 2002 Software: Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000 Impact: Privilege Elevation Max Risk: Moderate Bulletin: MS02-001 Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-001.asp. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Issue: ====== Trust relationships are created between Windows NT or Windows 2000 domains to allow users in one domain to access resources in other domains without requiring them to authenticate separately to each domain. When a user in a trusted domain requests access to a resource in a trusting domain, the trusted domain supplies authorization data in the form of a list of Security Identifiers (SIDs) that indicate the user's identity and group memberships. The trusting domain uses this data to determine whether to grant the user's request. A vulnerability exists because the trusting domain does not verify that the trusted domain is actually authoritative for all the SIDs in the authorization data. If one of the SIDs in the list identified a user or security group that is not in the trusted domain, the trusting domain would accept the information and use it for subsequent access control decisions. If an attacker inserted SIDs of his choice into the authorization data at the trusted domain, he could elevate his privileges to those associated with any desired user or group, including the Domain Administrators group for the trusting domain. This would enable the attacker to gain full Domain Administrator access on computers in the trusting domain. Exploiting this vulnerability would be difficult, and require administrative privileges on the trusted domain, as well as the technical wherewithal to modify low-level operating system functions and data structures. - Windows NT 4.0 provides no mechanism by which additional SIDs could be added to authorization data. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would need to develop and install custom operating system components to add the SIDs. - Windows 2000 does provide a mechanism for introducing additional SIDs into authorization data, known as SIDHistory. However, there is no programming interface that would allow an attacker - even with administrative rights - to introduce a desired SID into the SIDHistory information; instead, an attacker would need to perform a binary edit of the data structures that hold the SIDHistory information. Microsoft has developed a mechanism called SID Filtering that eliminates the vulnerability and adds further protection between trusting domains. When installed and enabled on the domain controllers of a trusting domain, SID Filtering causes the system to inspect all incoming authorization data and remove any SIDs that do not identify a user or security group that is defined in the trusted domain. There are, however, tradeoffs associated with using the SID Filtering mechanism. These are summarized in the FAQ and Caveats sections below, and are discussed in detail in Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q289243 and in a technical white paper (http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/administration/security /sidfilter.asp) that Microsoft strongly urges administrators to read before using SID Filtering. This is especially important in the case of administrators who are in the midst of migrating their networks from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000. Mitigating Factors: ==================== - The attacker would need to have domain administrator privileges in the trusted domain in order to exploit the vulnerability. - The attacker's domain would need to already be trusted by the target domain, or the target domain's administrator would need to approve the establishment of a new trust relationship. - There is no capability for the attacker to unilaterally initiate a trust relationship with another domain or cause it to trust the attacker's domain. - The attacker would need to modify operating system components and data. Risk Rating: ============ - Internet systems: Low - Intranet systems: Moderate - Client systems: None Patch Availability: =================== - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the Security Bulletin at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-001.asp for information on obtaining this patch. Acknowledgment: =============== - Aelita Software (http://www.aelita.com) - Michel Trepanier of CMT Inc. and Loto-Quebec. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. [***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-001 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) M-027: Microsoft Internet Explorer-Content Type Falsification (Three Vulnerabilities) M-028: hplx-sendmail Vulnerability M-029: Red Hat glibc Vulnerability CIACTech02-001: Understanding the SSH CRC32 Exploit M-030: Multiple Remote Windows XP/ME/98 Universal Plug and Play Vulnerabilities M-031: Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login M-032: HP-UX Security Vulnerability with wu-ftpd 2.6 M-033: Snort IDS Denial of Service Vulnerability M-034: Window File Wiping Utilities Miss Alternate Data Streams M-035: Red Hat Linux "rsync" Vulnerability