__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Center ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Sun BIND Vulnerabilities [Sun Bulletin #00204] July 31, 2001 13:00 GMT Number L-127 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Four vulnerabilities existed in Sun's version of the Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND): Two buffer overflows, an input validation error, and disclosure of environment variables. PLATFORM: Those running Solaris(tm) 8, 7, 2.6, 2.5.1, 2.5, and 2.4 (SunOS(tm) 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, and 5.4). DAMAGE: The buffer overflows and input validation error could allow a malicious attacker to execute code with superuser privileges. The disclosure of environment variables occurs because the remote attacker has access to the program stack. SOLUTION: Apply the patches as indicated in the bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. Superuser privileges could be exploited by a ASSESSMENT: remote attacker. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/l-127.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun Bulletin #00204 *****] ______________________________________________________________________________ Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin Bulletin Number: #00204 Date: June 26, 2001 Cross-Ref: CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 Title: BIND ______________________________________________________________________________ The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS." Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law, void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in such jurisdiction. ______________________________________________________________________________ 1. Bulletins Topics Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 8, 7, 2.6, 2.5.1, 2.5, and 2.4 (SunOS(tm) 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, and 5.4) which relate to several vulnerabilities reported in CERT CA-2001-02. Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4 immediately on systems running SunOS 5.8, 5.7, 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, and 5.4 with Sun's implementation of BIND. 2. Who is Affected Vulnerable: Systems running Sun's implementation of BIND (in.named) on SunOS 5.8, 5.8_x86, 5.7, 5.7_x86, 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, and 5.4_x86 3. Understanding the Vulnerability The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 describes four vulnerabilities in certain versions of BIND. The four vulnerabilities are listed below along with the affected versions of Solaris and the version of BIND shipped with each version of Solaris. VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code Solaris 8 04/01* (BIND 8.2.2-p5) Solaris 8 Maintenance Update 4* (BIND 8.2.2-p5) VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1) Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3) VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1) Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3) VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables Solaris 2.4, 2.5 (BIND 4.8.3) Solaris 2.5.1** (BIND 4.9.3 and BIND 4.8.3) Solaris 2.6 (BIND 4.9.4-P1) Solaris 7 and 8 (BIND 8.1.2) * To determine if one is running Solaris 8 04/01 or Solaris 8 Maintenance Update 4, check the contents of the /etc/release file. ** Solaris 2.5.1 ships with BIND 4.8.3 but patch 103663-01 for SPARC and 103664-01 for x86 upgrades BIND to 4.9.3, current revision for each patch is -17. CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 is available at: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html 4. List of Patches The following patches are available in relation to the above problems. OS Version Patch ID __________ _________ SunOS 5.8 109326-04 SunOS 5.8_x86 109327-04 SunOS 5.7 107018-03 SunOS 5.7_x86 107019-03 SunOS 5.6 105755-10 SunOS 5.6_x86 105756-10 SunOS 5.5.1 103663-16 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103664-16 SunOS 5.5 103667-12 SunOS 5.5_x86 103668-12 SunOS 5.4 102479-14 SunOS 5.4_x86 102480-12 _____________________________________________________________________________ APPENDICES A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at: ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS C. Sun security bulletins are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/security D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact one or more of the following: - Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to: security-alert@sun.com F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System) mailing list, send email to: security-alert@sun.com with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands: Command Information Returned/Action Taken _______ _________________________________ help An explanation of how to get information key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key list A list of current security topics query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team. 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This Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. [***** End Sun Bulletin #00204 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) L-117: The Code Red Worm L-118: Hewlett-Packard ftpd and ftp Vulnerability L-119: Hewlett-Packard mkacct Program Vulnerability L-120: Cisco "Code Red" Worm Impact L-121: SSH Secure Shell Remote Root Exploit Vulnerability L-122: FreeBSD tcpdump Remote Buffer OVerflow Vulnerability L-123: AIX libi18n Library Vulnerability L-124: Remote Buffer Overflow in telnetd L-125: SGI netprint Dynamic Shared Objects (DSO) Exploit L-126: Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Server Vulnerability