__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Center ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN The VBS.AnnaKournikova Worm February 13, 2001 01:00 GMT Number L-046A [Revision A 2/14/2001 added Microsoft SR-1 URL] ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A new worm named VBS.AnnaKournikova is spreading in the wild. It runs under the windows scripting host and uses the Outlook program to send itself as an attachment to everyone in your address book. The e-mail message has the subject: "Here you have, ;o)" and body: "Hi:", "Check This!". The attachment is named: "AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs" though the .vbs extension may be hidden. PLATFORM: Windows platforms with the Windows Scripting Host and Microsoft Outlook installed. DAMAGE: Does not damage files but sends an e-mail to everyone in your address book which may clog mailservers. SOLUTION: If you receive an e-mail with the subject, body and attachment mentioned above, do not run the attachment. If the attachment is not run, the worm will not propagate. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY HIGH. The worm is actively spreading and most antivirus ASSESSMENT: programs do not yet detect it. ______________________________________________________________________________ The VBS.AnnaKournikova Worm A new worm has been seen in the wild and is spreading rapidly. The worm is similar to the LoveLetter Worm but is much simpler and is not damaging to systems other than to use them to spread itself. The worm arrives as an e-mail message from someone you know. The e-mail has the following characteristics: Subject: Here you have, ;o) Body: Hi Check This! Attachment: AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs Operation ========= The worm executes under the Windows Scripting Host and propagates using the Microsoft Outlook program. When the attachment is executed the worm creates the registry entry: HKCU\software\OnTheFly\Worm made with Vbswg 1.50b It then copies itself into the file %windir%\AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs where %windir% is your current Windows installation directory (\Windows, \Winnt, depends on where you installed Windows). The worm checks the registry key: HKCU\software\OnTheFly\mailed To see if it is 1. This is to prevent it from sending itself out more than once. It then opens Outlook and sends itself to everyone in all your address books. After sending itself out, it checks the date, and if it is January 26, it opens a web browser to the website: http://www.dynabyte.nl which has an odd front page containing a hidden window. The hidden window is currently blank. Lastly, the worm starts an infinite loop that watches over the running copy of the worm and replaces it whenever it is deleted. Rebooting your system will kill this loop as will killing the wscript.exe process. Removal ======= Removing the worm requires a system reboot to kill the running worm, removal of the e-mail message and its attachment, removal of the AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs file in the windows directory and removal of the two registry keys: HKCU\software\OnTheFly\Worm made with Vbswg 1.50b HKCU\software\OnTheFly\mailed The registry keys have no effect on your operating system and could be left in place without causing any harm. The second registry key with a value of 1 prevents a future infection with this worm from spreading. For Further Information: ======================= See CIAC Bulletin K-039: VBS.LoveLetter.A Worm (http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/k-039.shtml) for information on detecting or disabling the Windows Scripting Host. For additional information, check out Microsoft's Outlook 2000 SR-1 Update: E-mail Security (http://office.microsoft.com/2000/downloadDetails/Out2ksec.htm) which describes Microsoft's approach to addressing .vbs and other executable attachments. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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