__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft Netmon Protocol Parsing November 8, 2000 21:00 GMT Number L-016 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Microsoft Network Monitor (Netmon) has a buffer overflow that could result in unauthorized control of a server. PLATFORM: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server Microsoft Windows 2000 Server Microsoft Systems Management Server 1.2 and 2.0 DAMAGE: Either causing Netmon to fail or causing code of the malicious user's choice to run on the machine. SOLUTION: Install Microsoft provided patch. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is HIGH. Vulnerability allows remote administrative ASSESSMENT: access without prior privileges. ______________________________________________________________________________ [****** Start Microsoft Bulletin ******] Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-083) - -------------------------------------- Patch Available for "Netmon Protocol Parsing" Vulnerability Originally posted: November 01, 2000 Summary ======= Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a security vulnerability in Microsoft(r) Windows NT(r) and Windows(r) 2000 server products and Systems Management Server. The vulnerability could allow a malicious user to gain control of an affected server. Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability and the patch can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-083.asp Issue ===== Microsoft ships two versions of Network Monitor (Netmon): a basic version that ships with Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 server products, and full version that ships as part of Systems Management Server (SMS) 1.2 and 2.0. Both versions include protocol parsers that aid administrators in interpreting and analyzing previously-captured network data. However, several of the parsers have unchecked buffers. If a malicious user delivered a specially-malformed frame to a server that was monitoring network traffic, and the administrator parsed it using an affected parser, it would have the effect of either causing Netmon to fail or causing code of the malicious user's choice to run on the machine. Netmon requires administrative privileges to run, but should only be run by local, rather than domain, administrators. If this is done, the vulnerability could be used to gain complete control over the local machine, but could not be used to gain control over a domain. Netmon does not ship on workstation products, so unless SMS had been installed on a workstation, it would not be affected by this vulnerability. Affected Software Versions ========================== - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise Edition - Microsoft Windows 2000 Server - Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server - Microsoft Windows 2000 Datacenter Server - Microsoft Systems Management Server 1.2 - Microsoft Systems Management Server 2.0 Note: Netmon does not ship as part of Windows NT 4.0 Workstation or Windows 2000 Professional. These products would only be affected if SMS had been installed on them. Patch Availability ================== - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server and Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise Edition: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=25487 - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition: To be released shortly. - Microsoft Windows 2000 Server, Advanced Server and Datacenter Server: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=25485 - Microsoft Systems Management Server 1.2: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=25505 - Microsoft Systems Management Server 2.0: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=25514 Note: Customers who are running SMS should apply the SMS patch, regardless of the platform they are running on. Customers who are not running SMS but are using an affected server should apply the operating system patch. Note: - The patch for Windows NT 4.0 Server and Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise Edition, should be applied atop Service Pack 6a. It will be included in Service Pack 7. - The patch for Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition, should be applied atop Service Pack 6. It will be included in Service Pack 7. - The patch for Windows 2000 can be applied to computers running Windows 2000 "Gold" or Service Pack 1. It will be included in Windows Service Pack 2. - The patch for SMS 1.2 should be applied atop SMS 1.2 Service Pack 4. - The patch for SMS 2.0 can be applied to SMS 2.0 Gold, Service Pack 1, or Service Pack 2. It will be included in Service Pack 3. Note: Additional security patches are available at the Microsoft Download Center More Information ================ Please see the following references for more information related to this issue. - Frequently Asked Questions: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-083, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-083.asp - Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q274835 discusses this issue and will be available soon. - Microsoft TechNet Security web site, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/default.asp Obtaining Support on this Issue =============================== This is a fully supported patch. Information on contacting Microsoft Product Support Services is available at http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp. Acknowledgments =============== Microsoft thanks COVERT Labs at PGP Security, Inc. (http://www.pgp.com/), and the ISS X-force (http://xforce.iss.net/) for reporting this issue to us and working with us to protect customers. Revisions ========= - November 01, 2000: Bulletin Created. [****** End Microsoft Bulletin ******] CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC: 1. Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or 2. Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or 3. Send e-mail to 4498369@skytel.com, or 4. Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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