__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft "DTS Password" Vulnerability July 12, 2000 19:00 GMT Number K-059 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Execute permission checks are not handled properly. A malicious user may run a temporary stored database procedure, which can execute a permanent stored database procedure. Unauthorized access to the SQL database can be achieved. PLATFORM: Systems running Microsoft SQL Server 7.0, or Enterprise Manager. DAMAGE: A malicious user may gain unauthorized access to an SQL database. Access could be used to review/add/delete information in the data base, through the use of permanent stored database procedures. SOLUTION: Follow the recommendations for securing of the System Administrator (SA) account. Install the patch to correct the execution permission problem. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is LOW. While the problem has been publicly announced, ASSESSMENT: a set of conditions must exist for this to be exploited. ______________________________________________________________________________ [****** Begin Microsoft Security Advisory ******] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This bulletin was updated to reflect a similar vulnerability with Enterprise Manager. ================================================================ Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-041) - -------------------------------------- Patch Available for "DTS Password" Vulnerability Originally posted: June 13, 2000 Updated: July 11, 2000 Summary ======= On June 13, 2000, Microsoft released a patch that eliminates a security vulnerability in a component that ships with Microsoft(r) SQL Server 7.0. If the component is configured improperly, the vulnerability could allow passwords to be compromised. On July 11, 2000, Microsoft is updating this bulletin to reflect a similar issue with the Enterprise Manager Server registration dialog. A new version of the patch is available to remedy all symptoms related to this vulnerability. Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability and the patch can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-041.asp Issue ===== Data Transformation Service (DTS) packages in SQL Server 7.0 allow database administrators to create a package that will perform a particular database action at regular intervals. As part of the creation of a DTS package, the administrator provides the account name and password under which the action should be taken. However, the password can be retrieved by programmatically interrogating the package's Properties dialogue. We have also found this vulnerability within the Registered Servers Dialog under Enterprise Manager. The vulnerability could only occur if several best practices have not been followed: - The creator of the DTS package chose to supply a username and password instead of using Windows Authentication. - The DTS package was created without restricting who can edit it. - The SQL Server administrator allowed Guest access to the SQL Server MSDB database. - A SQL Server is registered under Enterprise Manager using a username and password instead of using Windows Authentication. Affected Software Versions ========================== - Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 Patch Availability ================== - Intel: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=21905 - Alpha: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=21906 Note Additional security patches are available at the Microsoft Download Center More Information ================ Please see the following references for more information related to this issue. - Frequently Asked Questions: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-041, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-041.asp - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article, Q264880 - Microsoft TechNet Security web site, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/default.asp Obtaining Support on this Issue =============================== This is a fully supported patch. Information on contacting Microsoft Technical Support is available at http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp . Revisions ========= - June 13, 2000: Bulletin Created. - July 11, 2000: Updated to discuss similar vulnerability with Enterprise Manager. - --------------------------------------------------------------------- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. - Last Updated July 11, 2000 (c) 2000 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of use. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.3 iQEVAwUBOWypYI0ZSRQxA/UrAQESpgf+L5ge/f6uQWQB3etaRP8hZ6qp8sQhaleJ OJd0IKATBral4lXSh35yqb3tFQGyJ/yikcMEP91K+sH42U4hzJtCaZUyL8/XZVRx 3LetudMEkHgc0nHSRWUO10I2icXEN50Di5SEGMuAcn5OytC6sMOQ3t7aY7kN0jU3 nA6uRRhlSa5XUxb7ZgwZeA+ov4fa4EsVtOVTbKdbCQ74idI0BlmMfsLud2CqIPap KdmABchp4dvY43U2/1hL++1oC4Zyhxv4vycX/JtO0iP6jArsSlHDPH0cnxHcMpdA PEbVSiMmFdDe1pVxLzQOEWBXLyh2dfuLs3G0XNK4Z39OC9rePMNEYQ== =QDde -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [****** End Microsoft Security Advisory ******] CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. 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Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the information contained in this bulletin. 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