-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI arrayd default security configuration SGI Security Advisor 19990701-01-P July 22, 1999 23:00 GMT Number J-052 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: The default security configuration of arrayd from array.auth(4) does not provide adequate protection against attack when the array of clustered systems are placed on an untrusted network. PLATFORM: IRIX systems: 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.5.3, and 6.5.4. UNICOS systems: 9.0.X.X, 10.0, 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.4, 10.0.0.5, and 10.0.0.6. DAMAGE: Exploiting this vulnerability can lead to a root compromise. SOLUTION: Apply the workaround given in the bulletin below. This issue will be corrected in future releases of UNICOS and the IRIX applications CD. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is high for a root compromise of vulnerable systems. ASSESSMENT: SGI HIGHLY RECOMMENDS that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphics Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI Security Advisory Title: SGI arrayd default security configuration Number: 19990701-01-P Date: July 19, 1999 ______________________________________________________________________________ SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ +---------------------+ |-- Issue Specifics --| +---------------------+ The SGI Array Services provide a mechanism to simplify administering and managing an array of clustered systems. The arrayd(1m) program is part of the array_services(5) and is known as the array services daemon. Unfortunately, the default security configuration of arrayd from array.auth(4) does not provide adequate protection against attack when the array of clustered systems are placed on an untrusted network. For example, if the systems are placed on the Internet without a firewall, there is a possible root compromise of all clustered systems in the array when the default array.auth configuration is used. SGI has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of UNICOS and the IRIX applications CD. +------------+ |-- Impact --| +------------+ On IRIX, the SGI Array services consists of an inst image called arraysvcs. The arraysvcs inst image is installed by default on IRIX 6.4-6.5.4 from the IRIX Applications CD and available as an optional product for IRIX 6.2-6.3. All sites using array services on UNICOS 9.0 or later are vulnerable. Array services are not supported on UNICOS/mk, so it is not vulnerable. The default arrayd.auth configuration file has authentication disabled. A local user account on the vulnerable array is not required in order to exploit the arrayd daemon. The arrayd daemon can be exploited remotely over an untrusted network. The arrayd vulnerability can lead to a root compromise on an untrusted network if the array services are running and the arrayd.auth configuration file has not been changed to enable authentication. It is believed that this vulnerability in arrayd has not been publicly discussed outside of SGI. +------------------------+ |-- Temporary Solution --| +------------------------+ The steps below can be used to either 1) remove the vulnerability by removing the Array Services if they are not being used or 2) enable authorization using a appropriately setup arrayd.auth(4) configuration file. +-+-+-+-+ |I R I X| +-+-+-+-+ 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Check to see if the system is running the SGI Array Services. # chkconfig Flag State ==== ===== array off If the Array Services are disabled, the system is not vulnerable to the arrayd vulnerability. If required, the arraysvcs inst image can be removed using following command: ================= **** WARNING **** ================= This will completely remove the SGI Array Services programs # versions remove arraysvcs 3) Edit the default arrayd.auth file to enable authentication. # vi /usr/lib/array/arrayd.auth 4) Comment out authentication entry in the arrayd.auth file. This will enable SIMPLE authentication. # AUTHENTICATION NONE 5) Configure SIMPLE authentication in the arrayd.auth file if array services are needed on untrusted networks. See arraysvcs release notes or arrayd.auth man page for more information on configuring SIMPLE authentication. 6) Restart the arrayd daemon so that it will read the new configuration files. # /etc/init.d/array restart 7) Return to previous level. # exit % +-+-+-+-+-+-+ |U N I C O S| +-+-+-+-+-+-+ 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Edit the default arrayd.auth file to enable authentication. # vi /usr/lib/array/arrayd.auth 3) Replace AUTH NONE entry with AUTH SIMPLE in the arrayd.auth file. This will enable SIMPLE authentication. Find AUTH NONE Replace with AUTH SIMPLE 4) Configure SIMPLE authentication in the arrayd.auth file if array services are needed on untrusted networks. See arrayd.auth man page for more information on configuring SIMPLE authentication. 5) Restart the arrayd daemon so that it will read the new configuration files. # /etc/init.d/array restart 6) Return to previous level. # exit % +--------------+ |-- Solution --| +--------------+ +-+-+-+-+ |I R I X| +-+-+-+-+ On IRIX, the Array Services security issue is scheduled to be fixed in the next release of the IRIX applications CD. OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x-5.X no Note 1 IRIX 6.0.x no Note 1 IRIX 6.1 no Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes not avail Note 2 & 3 IRIX 6.3 yes not avail Note 1 & 3 IRIX 6.4 yes not avail Note 1 & 3 IRIX 6.5 yes not avail Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.1 yes not avail Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.2 yes not avail Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.3 yes not avail Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.4 yes not avail Note 3 & 4 NOTES 1) This version of the IRIX operating system has retired. Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system. See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix2.html for more information. 2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode. See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix1.html for more information. 3) See "Temporary Solution" section. 4) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.X CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your SGI Support Provider or download the IRIX 6.5.X Maintenance Release Stream from http://support.sgi.com/ or ftp://support.sgi.com/support/relstream/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ |U N I C O S| +-+-+-+-+-+-+ OS Versions Vulnerable? Other Actions ----------- ----------- ------------- UNICOS /mk No UNICOS 9.0.X.X Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.1 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.2 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.3 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.4 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.5 Yes Note 1 UNICOS 10.0.0.6 Yes Note 1 NOTES 1) See "Temporary Solution" section. +----------------------+ |-- Acknowledgments ---| +----------------------+ SGI wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center and Yuri Volobuev for their assistance in this matter. +---------------------------------------+ |-- SGI Security Information/Contacts --| +---------------------------------------+ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBN5NqFbQ4cFApAP75AQGg0wP/SSPH0YNxTagKfj0ox29N6bvIkMOxJ/3j poT04GVmpnBwThU3dlPArErQxOp+XUkwjcENY8qUlp7Vc0S/OViB3kawPOa6byaD pJQ54wO5zzG/cTl6IsljxV8MKnXMOFQ90dWDcMJHyhyjzCvPgwlWs+dYVPNlTWMJ xd8rAuUHrXo= =KGAX - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge Silicon Graphics for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 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