-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd June 10, 1999 21:00 GMT Number J-045 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Two vulnerabilities are address in this advisory: 1) rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among NFS clients and servers. 2) automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of file systems. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a Remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same targeted machine. PLATFORM: SGI IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable to rpc.statd but no longer supported. Unpatched IRIX 6.2 and above are vulnerable to automountd. SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3. DAMAGE: This combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative privileges of the automountd service, typically root. SOLUTION: Apply the vendor-supplied patch. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Risk is high due to these vulnerabilities having been widely ASSESSMENT: discussed on public forums such as BugTraq. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start CERT Advisory ] CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd Original issue date: June 9, 1999 Source: CERT/CC Systems Affected Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd I. Description This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that system and network administrators who have not addressed these problems do so immediately. The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an authentic call from the rpc.statd process. The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time, and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the appropriate patches. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative privileges of the automountd service, typically root. Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories CA-96.09 and CA-97.26. II. Impact The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process, typically root. The vulnerability in automountd may allow a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. Note It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd. If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services (including services you have written), an intruder may be able to exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time, we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited through this mechanism. III. Solutions Install a patch from your vendor Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. Appendix A: Vendor Information Caldera Caldera's currently not shipping statd. Compaq Computer Corporation (c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights reserved. SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Services Software Security Response Team USA This reported problem has not been found to affect the as shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software. - Compaq Computer Corporation Data General We are investigating. We will provide an update when our investigation is complete. Hewlett-Packard Company HP is not vulnerable. The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. No SCO products are vulnerable. Silicon Graphics, Inc. % IRIX % rpc.statd IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported. % automountd With patches from SGI Security Advisory 19981005-01-PX installed, IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. % Unicos Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information is available for public release at this time. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution method including the wiretap mailing list. SGI Security Headquarters http://www.sgi.com/Support/security Sun Microsystems Inc. The following patches are available: rpc.statd: Patch OS Version _____ __________ 106592-02 SunOS 5.6 106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86 104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1 104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103468-04 SunOS 5.5 103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86 102769-07 SunOS 5.4 102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86 102932-05 SunOS 5.3 The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released. automountd: 104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1 104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103187-43 SunOS 5.5 103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86 101945-61 SunOS 5.4 101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86 101318-92 SunOS 5.3 SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not vulnerable. Sun security patches are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li cense&nav=pub-patches _______________________________________________________________ Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this advisory. _______________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html. _______________________________________________________________ [ End CERT Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge CERT for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC: CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 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Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. 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