-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN FTP Bounce Vulnerability May 6, 1998 23:00 GMT Number I-018a ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: The problem is based on the misuse of the PORT command in the FTP protocol. PLATFORMS: Cray Research - Unicos and Unicos/mk DIGITAL UNIX V3.2g, V4.0, V4.0a, V4.0b, V4.0c. FreeBSD 2.1.7 and earlier, 2.2.0 and later if allow -R option HP-UX - -9.X and 10.X, on HP 9000 series 300/400s and 700/800s IBM AIX - all ftp servers MadGoat - fixed in MGFTP V2.2-2 NCR Corporation - later than inet 05.01.01.62 inet 06.01.00.22 inet 06.02.00.03 NetBSD - 1.2.1 , no patches OpenBSD - prior to OpenBSD 2.1 SCO - OpenServer 5.0.4 UnixWare 2.1 ODT 3.0 CMW+ Siemens-Nixdorf - ReliantUNIX Sun Microsystems - SunOS 4.1.x and 5.x DAMAGE: An attacker may be able to establish a connection between the FTP server machine and an arbitrary port on another system. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY It is recommended that you install a comprehensive patch if one ASSESSMENT: is available or use the wu-ftpd package identified in Section III.B. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Append on May 6, 1998 with additional patch information from Digital ] [ Start CERT Advisory ] ============================================================================= CERT* Advisory CA-97.27 Original issue date: Dec. 10, 1997 Last revised: December 16, 1997 - Vendor updates for Sun Microsystems, Inc. A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Topic: FTP Bounce - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- In some implementations of FTP daemons, the PORT command can be misused to open a connection to a port of the attacker's choosing on a machine that the attacker could not have accessed directly. There have been ongoing discussions about this problem (called "FTP bounce") for several years, and some vendors have developed solutions for this problem. The CERT/CC staff urges you to install a comprehensive patch if one is available. Until then, we recommend the wu-ftpd package identified in Section III.B. as a workaround. We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please check our advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description In the past few years there have been ongoing discussions about a problem known as "FTP bounce." In its simplest terms, the problem is based on the misuse of the PORT command in the FTP protocol. To understand the FTP bounce attack, please see the tech tip at ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/FTP_PORT_attacks The core component of the problem is that by using the PORT command in active FTP mode, an attacker may be able to establish connections to arbitrary ports on machines other than the originating client. This behavior is RFC compliant, but it is also potentially a source of security problems for some sites. The example attacks described in the tech tip demonstrate the potential of this vulnerability. II. Impact An attacker may be able to establish a connection between the FTP server machine and an arbitrary port on another system. This connection may be used to bypass access controls that would otherwise apply. III. Solution Because the core element of the attack (the FTP server can establish connections to arbitrary machines and arbitrary ports) is also a required component for RFC compliance, there is no clear-cut solution. With this in mind, we urge you to carefully consider the type of service that your site offers. The best solution solely from a security perspective is to ensure that your FTP server software cannot establish connections to arbitrary machines. However, sites that rely on the RFC-compliant behavior may find that implementing this solution will affect applications that they use. (We have not received any first-hand reports of such cases.) Consequently, many vendors offer solutions that allow sites offering the FTP service to make the choice that best suits them. You should check to see what type of behavior your vendor's FTP daemon adopts (Section A). If you wish to implement an FTP service that does not allow this attack and your vendor does not offer a daemon with this functionality, consider using the wu-ftpd package described in Section B. Other steps you can take are described in Section C. A. Vendor Information It is our experience that vendor implementations fall into one of these groups: (1) strict conformance with RFC functionality: The PORT command may be used to connect directly to a third-party machine, and this is the only functionality allowed. Some vendors who choose to maintain strict conformance have addressed this problem by modifying all other network services to reject connections originating from the FTP data port (port 20). (2) strict suppression of the PORT command: The PORT command may be used to connect to the originating client, and this is the only functionality allowed. (3) variable PORT command behavior: The PORT command may be used in either of the above two ways, with one way being the default. Switching between them is usually achieved with a command line parameter. You should be careful to verify which is the default. Appendix A contains a list of vendors who have provided information about this problem. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. B. Use the wu-ftpd package as a workaround. The wu-ftpd package addresses the FTP bounce problem by ensuring that the PORT command cannot be used to establish connections to machines other than the originating client. Please read the wu-ftpd README file "FIXES-2.4-HOBBIT" before installing the package. The latest version of wu-ftpd, which we recommend, is available from ftp://ftp.academ.com/pub/wu-ftpd/private/wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta- 15.tar.Z DFN-CERT mirrors this software at ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/wuarchive-ftpd/academ-betas/wu- ftpd-2.4.2-beta-15.tar.Z MD5 (wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-15.tar.Z) = 6c8172b83ab2545a5b91a9aba4840630 If you use a previous version (whether a beta version or full release), do not assume that your site is immune from these problems or other problems discussed in previous advisories. C. FTP Configuration Some attacks rely on an intermediate file being uploaded to one or more server machines via (usually anonymous) FTP. This file is used in a later phase of the attack. Your site should offer anonymous upload facilities only if it is absolutely necessary. Even then, you must carefully configure the incoming area. For further details, see "Anonymous FTP Configuration Guidelines" at ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/anonymous_ftp_config Note that these steps only repel attacks that rely on intermediate uploads. The steps are not effective against other attacks. If your site allows file uploads, we urge your to ensure that the FTP service restricts the PORT command so that it can only be used to connect to the originating client. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Appendix A - Vendor Information Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact the vendor directly. Caldera, Inc. - - ------------- Caldera OpenLinux(tm) 1.2 ships with wu-ftpd-2.4.2 beta 15. For those with earlier versions of wu-ftpd, updates to this package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.caldera.com/pub/openlinux/updates/1.1/current/ Other Caldera security resources are located at: http://www.caldera.com/tech-ref/security/ Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company - - ------------------------------------------ The ftpd supplied with Unicos and Unicos/mk is currently in category 1. We are working to make it category 3. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION - - ----------------------------- DIGITAL UNIX V3.2c thru V3.2g DIGITAL UNIX V4.0 thru V4.0c At the time of writing this document, patches(binary kits) are in progress and final testing has been completed. Distribution of the fix for this problem is expected to begin soon (BL9 and possibly as early release patches). Digital will provide notice of the completion/availibility of the patches through AES services (DIA, DSNlink) the DIGITAL Patch Service WEB site, and be available from your normal Digital Support channel. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION 12/97 ----------------------------- ------ The FreeBSD Project - - ------------------- FreeBSD 2.2.0 and all later releases do not allow the FTP bounce attack (unless explicitly allowed by the -R option). FreeBSD 2.1.7 and earlier releases can be abused by the bounce attack. Hewlett-Packard Company - - ----------------------- This problem is addressed HP Security Bulletin 028. This bulletin can be found at one of these URLs: http://us-support.external.hp.com (for US, Canada, Asia-Pacific, & Latin-America) http://europe-support.external.hp.com (for Europe) ************************************************************************ Current patches for SB#28 as of 11/5/97 from security patch matrix ************************************************************************ Security Bulletin 028: Security Vulnerability in FTP Current Original -------------------- -------------------- s300 8.00: None s300 8.00: None s300 9.00: PHNE_6146 s300 9.00: PHNE_6146 s300 9.03: PHNE_6146 s300 9.03: PHNE_6146 s300 9.10: PHNE_6146 s300 9.10: PHNE_6146 s700 8.05: None s700 8.05: None s700 8.07: None s700 8.07: None s700 9.01: PHNE_10008 s700 9.01: PHNE_6013 s700 9.03: PHNE_10008 s700 9.03: PHNE_6013 s700 9.05: PHNE_10008 s700 9.05: PHNE_6013 s700 9.07: PHNE_10008 s700 9.07: PHNE_6013 s700 9.09: PHNE_6169 s700 9.09: PHNE_6169 PHNE_6170 PHNE_6170 s700 10.00: PHNE_10009 s700 10.00: PHNE_6014 s700 10.01: PHNE_10009 s700 10.01: PHNE_6014 s700 10.09: PHNE_5965 s700 10.09: PHNE_5965 s700 10.10: PHNE_10009 s700 10.10: None s700 10.16: None s700 10.16: None s700 10.20: None s700 10.20: None s700 10.24: None s700 10.24: None s700 10.30: None s700 10.30: None s800 8.00: None s800 8.00: None s800 8.02: None s800 8.02: None s800 8.06: None s800 8.06: None s800 9.00: PHNE_10008 s800 9.00: PHNE_6013 s800 9.04: PHNE_10008 s800 9.04: PHNE_6013 s800 9.08: PHNE_6171 s800 9.08: PHNE_6171 s800 10.00: PHNE_10009 s800 10.00: PHNE_6014 s800 10.01: PHNE_10009 s800 10.01: PHNE_6014 s800 10.09: None s800 10.09: None s800 10.10: PHNE_10009 s800 10.10: None s800 10.16: None s800 10.16: None s800 10.20: None s800 10.20: None s800 10.24: None s800 10.24: None s800 10.30: None s800 10.30: None *************************************************************************** Accessing the HP ESC *************************************************************************** Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches/Security Bulletins/Security patches are available via email and/or WWW (via the browser of your choice) on HP Supportline (HPSL). --------------------------------------------------------------------- To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from the HP SupportLine Digest service via electronic mail, do the following: 1) From your Web browser, access the URL: http://us-support.external.hp.com (US,Canada,Asia-Pacific, and Latin-America) http://europe-support.external.hp.com (Europe) Login with your user ID and password, or register for one (remember to save the User ID assigned to you, and your password). Once you are on the Main Menu, Click on the Technical Knowledge Database, and it will connect to a HP Search Technical Knowledge DB page. Near the bottom is a hyperlink to our Security Bulletin archive. Once in the archive there is another link to our current security patch matrix. Updated daily, this matrix is categorized by platform/OS release, and by bulletin topic. IBM Corporation - - --------------- All AIX ftp servers are vulnerable to the FTP bounce attack. The following fixes are in progress: AIX 3.2: upgrade to v4 AIX 4.1: IX73075 AIX 4.2: IX73076 AIX 4.3: IX73077 To Order -------- APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, reference URL: http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist". MadGoat - - ------- This problem is fixed in MGFTP V2.2-2, which was released several months ago. That version restricts the port numbers to ports above 1024. However, it does not block access to third-party machines. V2.2-4, scheduled for release next week, will do that as well. Microsoft Corporation - - --------------------- We prevent this attack by disallowing "third party" transfers. This is done via a modification to our implementation of the PORT command. When the FTP server receives a PORT command, the specified IP address *must* match the client's source IP address for the control channel. In other words, then the client sends a PORT command to the FTP server, giving the server an IP address & port number to connect back to the client for the data transfer, the IP address *must* be the client's original IP address. We have one other fix in which we disallow the PORT command from specifying reserved ports (those less than 1024) except port 20 (the default data port). By default, any client attempt to issue a port command with (port < 1024 && port != 20) will cause the PORT command to fail. This check can be disabled setting the EnablePortAttack registry value. NEC Corporation - - --------------- Several NEC Unix systems have proven vulnerable. Work is currently underway to identify all affected systems. Patches are forthcoming. NCR Corporation - - --------------- NCR is delivering a set of operating system dependent patches which contain an update for this problem. Accompanying each patch is a README file which discusses the general purpose of the patch and describes how to apply it to your system. Recommended solution: Apply one of the following patches depending on the revision of the inet package installed on your system. To check its version execute: pkginfo -x inet For inet 5.01.xx.xx: - PINET501 (Version later than 05.01.01.62) For inet 6.01.xx.xx: - PINET601 (Version later than 06.01.00.22) For inet 6.02.xx.xx: - PINET602 (Version later than 06.02.00.03) After installation of the respective patch, the default behavior will be to protect from this vulnerability.. A new ftpd man-page describe how to enable the old RFC compliant behavior. The NetBSD Project - - ------------------ There are no patches for NetBSD 1.2.1 or prior, however the ftpd sources available from: ftp.netbsd.org:/pub/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/libexec/ftpd should work on a NetBSD 1.2.1 machine. The OpenBSD project - - ------------------- FTP bounce can be fixed in the operating system by fixing all vulnerable services by checking for connections from port 20. Since this has been done in OpenBSD, OpenBSD is not vulnerable and does NOT NEED the variable port command. The solution applies since OpenBSD 2.1 (ie. it applies for both 2.1 and for 2.2). Red Hat Software - - ---------------- We ship wu-ftpd, so this isn't a problem for us. The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. - - ------------------------------ SCO has determined that the following Operating systems are vulnerable to the ftp-bounce attack :- OpenServer 5.0.4 UnixWare 2.1 ODT 3.0 CMW+ We are currently working on a fix to this problem. Siemens-Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG - - -------------------------------------- ReliantUNIX is vulnerable. The problem has been corrected in the current sources. Patches will be developed (as necessary) and made available via your Siemens-Nixdorf customers service. Sun Microsystems, Inc. - - ---------------------- Sun's FTP server software in SunOS 4.1.x and 5.x allow PORT requests to make data connections to arbitrary hosts. Prior to SunOS 5.6, Sun's FTP server software also allows data connections to arbitrary ports. In SunOS 5.6, the FTP server software does not accept PORT requests to make data connections to well-known (privileged) ports. Sun has also released the following patches that prevent Sun's FTP server software from accepting PORT requests to make data connections to well-known ports for the following SunOS releases: 103603-05 SunOS 5.5.1 103604-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103577-06 SunOS 5.5 103578-06 SunOS 5.5_x86 101945-51 SunOS 5.4 101946-45 SunOS 5.4_x86 104938-01 SunOS 5.3 104477-03 SunOS 4.1.4 104454-03 SunOS 4.1.3_U1 Sun recommends that sites that do not require their FTP server make connections to arbitrary hosts consider using wu-ftpd as a workaround. - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - The CERT Coordination Center thanks AUSCERT and DFN-CERT for helping develop this advisory. We also thank Steve Bellovin and the vendors who offered valuable comments on the problem and solutions: BSDI, Hewlett-Packard, Livingston, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Sun Microsystems. - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info/). CERT/CC Contact Information - - ---------------------------- Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html and ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff . If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with "copyright" in the subject line. *CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. - - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This file: ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.27.FTP_bounce http://www.cert.org click on "CERT Advisories" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Revision history Dec. 16, 1997 Vendor updates for Sun Microsystems, Inc. Dec. 11, 1997 Vendor updates for Caldera, Digital Equipment Corporation, NEC Corporation. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNJb3wnVP+x0t4w7BAQE5JAP/TPs3eXo2aUtJhKy7huiUubJoTD4SEjA7 1FnOu8sACjXjBaqRJJsS1THBpcWEXagHmPFfDunshwF+nm4Rf2MXa/pzLAzPJ7Pb dRi4WV3dun4w/nyPbS2bOWOGhTyRB+KKK3BfxPuQU4sgKVZEHzp8/qDmAK1CbAaA uqznIn5jcZM= =FFgn - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End CERT Advisory ] [ Append Digital Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________ UPDATE: APR 30, 1998 TITLE: DIGITAL UNIX ftpd V3.2g, V4.0, V4.0a, V4.0b, V4.0c - Potential Security Vulnerability ref#: SSRT0452U ftpd (ftp bounce) SOURCE: Digital Equipment Corporation Software Security Response Team "Digital is broadly distributing this Security Advisory in order to bring to the attention of users of Digital's products the important security information contained in this Advisory. Digital recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. Digital does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, Digital will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Advisory." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- IMPACT: Digital has discovered a potential vulnerability with the FTP (bounce) for DIGITAL UNIX software, where under certain circumstances, an user may gain unauthorized privileges. Digital strongly recommends upgrading to a minimum of Digital UNIX V4.0b accordingly, and that the appropriate patch kit be installed immediately. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- RESOLUTION: This potential security problem has been resolved and an official patch for this problem has been made available as an early release kit for DIGITAL UNIX V4.0a (duv40ass0000600041100-19980317.*) and, included in the latest DIGITAL UNIX V4.0b aggregate DUPATCH Kit. The V3.2g aggregate BL 10 patch kit #5 is scheduled for release in late June 1998. The V4.0 aggregate BL 9 patch kit #6 is scheduled for release mid May 1998. The V4.0c aggregate BL10 patch kit #6 is scheduled for release mid May 1998. *This potential problem was included in the distributed release of DIGITAL UNIX V4.0d o the World Wide Web at the following FTP address: http://www.service.digital.com/html/patch_service.html Use the FTP access option, select DIGITAL_UNIX directory then choose the appropriate version directory and download the patch accordingly. Note: [1]The appropriate patch kit must be installed following any upgrade to V4.0a, V4.0b, or V4.0c. [2] Please review the appropriate release notes prior to installation. If you need further information, please contact your normal DIGITAL support channel. DIGITAL appreciates your cooperation and patience. We regret any inconvenience applying this information may cause. As always, Digital urges you to periodically review your system management and security procedures. Digital will continue to review and enhance the security features of its products and work with customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their systems. ______________________________________________________________ Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation, 1998 All Rights Reserved. Unpublished Rights Reserved Under The Copyright Laws Of The United States. ______________________________________________________________ [ End Digital Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (198.128.39.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) I-008: Open Group OSF/DCE Denial-of-Service Vulnerability i-009: IBM AIX libDtSvc.a Buffer Overflow Vulnerability I-010: HP-UX CDE Vulnerability I-011: IBM AIX portmir command Vulnerability I-012: IBM AIX ftp client Vulnerability I-013: Count.cgi Buffer Overrun Vulnerabiliity I-014: Vulnerability in GlimpseHTTP and WebGlimpse cgi-bin Packages I-015: SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (syserr and permissions programs) I-016: SCO /usr/bin/X11/scoterm Vulnerability I-017: statd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNJmZi7nzJzdsy3QZAQFgTgQAt05IUzKESPC/SJwTk4zhLTMtdA7N4KzK vPBDrXdnPK9Fv1IZhFV/1rlozh6DfAVXqoOsvm3k0ax4vq8hAtVWwWjpDwHzhYM4 mUbZmIhgJVcyrobFSuQczopmmX0GnOFFJolKDH7IqGkD8GdmRAzPHb3K0Ac64+bh DeD3bIx+c8s= =Xu8l -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----